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England needs an integrated public services ombudsman,
organised regionally
The House of Commons Public Administration Committee is currently considering the role of the Parliamentary
and Health Service Ombudsman. Professor Patrick Dunleavy, Co-Director of Democratic Audit gave evidence
at the Committee’s most recent hearing on the topic. In this post, Richard Berry summarises the evidence
presented and highlights key recommendations for improving the Ombudsman’s role in citizen redress.
The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) investigates complaints f rom people who f eel
they have been treated unf airly or received a poor service f rom government organisations and the NHS in
England. Last year, the PHSO received almost 27,000 enquiries f rom the public, an increase of  13% on the
previous year. The Public Administration Committee scrutinises the work of  the PHSO, and in its most
recent session took evidence f rom Prof essor Dunleavy, alongside Prof essor Robert Hazell of  University
College London and Brian Thompson of  the University of  Liverpool.
Fragmentation of cit izen redress
One of  the main themes of  the session was the f ragmentation of  the system of  cit izen redress in the UK,
particularly in England. Within public services there is a distinction between complaints (which the PHSO
handles) and appeals, a more legalistic process. This distinction, Prof essor Dunleavy argued, is
unintelligible f or the public:
The separation of appeals and complaints is just a completely bizarre piece of Whitehall
thinking.  In some ways, a complaint is supposed to be some kind of attribution of blame,
whereas an appeal is asking for a second look.  From an ordinary citizen’s point of view, the
difference between those is abstruse and metaphysical.
As a way of  simplif ying the process and making redress easier f or cit izens to achieve, Prof essor Dunleavy
suggested the PHSO introduce a f aster process f or handling the vast majority of  complaints that do not
require prolonged investigation.  He drew on the example of  the Financial Ombudsman Service, which has
an init ial mediation process that is completed within six weeks:
There could be a quick mediation phase where the Ombudsman really tries to get to the heart
of what the complainant is unhappy about and then tries to get the body that has been
complained about to really look at this again… It would do it quickly, whereas the whole
investigation thing tends to mean very prolonged, very drawn out, very expensive and very poor
value for money activity.
Scope and powers of the PHSO
The Committee questioned witnesses about the scope of  the PHSO, both in terms of  the services it deals
with and its geographical coverage.  Prof essor Dunleavy highlighted the existence of  multiple other
ombudsmen as well as the PHSO, particularly the Local Government Ombudsman and the Housing
Ombudsman, which exacerbated the f ragmentation of  cit izen redress mechanisms.  He also argued that the
national level – with a population of  over 50 million people, England is one of  the largest administrative
units f or cit izen redress in the world – was not the most ef f ective level f or the PHSO to operate at:
The time is long overdue when we should aim to create within England the same kind of
integrated Public Services Ombudsman that we see in Scotland and Wales, which looks across
health, local government and central Government services, and does this in an integrated way.
 Ideally, the Parliamentary Ombudsman Service would have a regional setup like the Local
Government Ombudsman has, with a level somewhere between three and nine Government
regions.
Witnesses discussed the powers available to the PHSO. There was consensus on the need to extend
these to allow the Ombudsman to investigate issues pro-actively, rather than only responding to specif ic
complaints. Brian Thompson drew on research conducted overseas in making this case:
One of the techniques they have in other countries, which we do not have here, is the idea of an
‘own‑initiative’ investigation, which allows them to carry out an investigation into something
which they think has systemic implications, but they have not actually received a complaint
about it.  I know that particular power is something that the UK Ombudsman would like to have.
 Certainly, when we were in Australia and we told them that UK Ombudsmen did not have that,
they were flabbergasted; they could not conceive that you could be operating as efficiently as
you might without that power.
Parliament and the PHSO
Another theme of  the hearing was the relationship of  the PHSO to Parliament. Witnesses acknowledge a
potential paradox in the Public Administration Committee’s own dual role in relation to the PHSO. As
Prof essor Hazell suggested:
There is clearly a tension.  [The Committee] is both the Ombudsman’s champion in Parliament
and the wider world, but also the primary select committee that scrutinises the work of the
Ombudsman, her efficiency and her effectiveness…  I think you just need to be very clear in
your own minds and very clear with the Ombudsman which hat you are wearing in any particular
session or activity when you are dealing with the Ombudsman.
Prof essor Dunleavy advocated a new model similar to that of  the National Audit Of f ice (NAO) and the
House of  Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC).  The NAO’s auditing work underpins the scrutiny
investigations of  the PAC, but the PAC itself  does not scrutinise the NAO: this task is perf ormed by a
separate Public Accounts Commission.
An issue warranting lengthy discussion at the hearing was the ‘MP f ilter ’.  This term describes the rule that
states the PHSO can only take up complaints that have come f rom via a Member of  Parliament, rather than
directly f rom the public (except in healthcare matters).  The PHSO has argued that the f ilter should be
removed.  Prof essor Dunleavy set out his support f or the proposal:
Effective liaison between the Ombudsman and MPs would be a very important thing to
safeguard, but… I do not think that is what the MP filter is doing.  At the moment, what the MP
filter is doing is putting off a lot of people… and inhibiting the Ombudsman in developing their
relations with the public, in a very restrictive way.  I would really like to see direct access from
the public to the Ombudsman.
Further inf ormation about the Committee’s inquiry and the f ull transcript of  this hearing can be f ound on
the Committee’s website.
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